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Abstract 
 
Risks are involved in all phases of the software life cycle, and due to these risks, software can 
face various problems that can cause different negative outcomes and sometimes, in extreme 
cases, the failure of the software. Most of these risks lie in the legacy software migration 
process. These risks can create many problems, and in the worst case they can lead to the 
failure of the migration project. This paper explores different types of risk analysis methods 
such as CRAMM, CORAS, OCTAVE and VECTOR. After comparing these methods, the two 
suitable methods were chosen, namely, OCTAVE and VECTOR. Based on the use of these 
two methods, the project suggests an enhanced EOV method for risk analysis in the migration 
of legacy software. 
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1. Introduction 
Developments in computer and software technology have made this technology a part of 
daily life. Despite the advances in software technology and the demands for various 
applications, there are many existing legacy applications that pose different kinds of problems 
for organisations that no longer have a justification for using them. Therefore, these systems 
should be migrated to a new system which can work more effectively in the new environment. 
There are risks in the migration process that could create problems; therefore, prior to 
commencing the migration process, the possible risks should be analysed.  
A simple definition of risk is that it is “a problem that has not yet happened but which could 
cause 
some loss or threaten the success of the project if it did” [1].  In a legacy migration project, risk 
analysis is an important step before implementing a new application technology. In order to 
identify the possible risks in a new technology deployment project, the relevant personnel 
should know how to perform a suitable risk analysis. A number of methods have been 
proposed for risk analysis such as Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability 
Evaluation (OCTAVE), VECTOR matrix, and Central Computer and Telecommunications 
Agency Risk Analysis and Management Method (CRAMM) [2].  
One of the most important and difficult activities in software engineering is security 
maintenance in the migration of a legacy system to a new system. Security maintenance is a 
serious consideration because two-thirds of a software system’s lifetime cost involves 
maintenance. 
Risk may appear in every kind of investment. If a company wants to change its legacy 
software to a new one, it has to calculate the risk of failure and other possible hazards. To 
decrease the risks, a suitable risk analysis is necessary [3]. The aim of any risk analysis is to 
provide decision-makers with the best possible information about the probability of loss. As a 
result, it is important that decision-makers accept the risk analysis method that has been used, 
and that the information resulting from the analysis is in a useful form.   
Despite the importance of risk analysis in legacy migration, little research has been undertaken 
on this topic. The current project aimed to review the relevant risk analysis methods and 
identify the most suitable methods for the analysis of possible risks in the migration of legacy 
software [4]. These methods could be used in combination in order to achieve the best results 
in the risk assessment. 
In this study, we compared existing information security risk analysis methods in order to 
choose the most suitable methods for risk analysis in the migration of software. We proposed 
an enhanced risk analysis method for the migration process, including the implementation and 
evaluation of the enhanced method [5]. 
2. Related Work 
2.1 Methods of risk analysis 
Risk analysis includes processes such as the identification of activities, vulnerability analysis, 
threat analysis, and guarantees. Fig. 1 shows a comparison of some existing methodologies. 
The first ranked method was OCTAVE, followed by CRAMM [6]. The next highest ranked 
was CORAS, followed by FRAP, ISRAM, COBRA, CORAS, Risk Watch and finally id IS. 
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Fig. 1. Rankings of different risk analysis methods. 
 
As shown in Fig. 2, OCTAVE was mentioned significantly more times than other risk analysis 
methods. This indicates that OCTAVE is a suitable risk analysis method that could be applied 
to any type of case study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. OCTAVE mentions compared to other methodologies. 
 
2.2 OCTAVE 
OCTAVE was developed at the CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC). The focus of the 
OCTAVE approach is on activities, threats, and vulnerabilities. One of the important concepts 
of OCTAVE is self-direction, whereby the employees in the organization should practice 
information security risk assessments. An analysis team composed of staff from the 
organisation's business units is responsible for running the assessment and recording the 
results. 
The OCTAVE method has three phases, with each phase divided into processes [7]. The three 
phases are: build asset-based threat profiles, identify     infrastructure     vulnerabilities    and 
develop a security strategy and plans. The phases of OCTAVE method and their detailed 
description is presented as follows (Fig. 3). 
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Fig. 3. Phases of OCTAVE method 
 
Phase 1: Build Asset-Based Threat Profiles 
Phase 1 of the OCTAVE approach involves the evaluation of the company’s security strategy. 
During this phase, the employees have to be informed about the resources possessed by the 
company, each of which requires special protection. Security requirements for this type of 
resource have to be considered [8]. The staff describe the security measures carried out by the 
company and try to find the weaknesses in this strategy. Through interviews with the 
employees, primary information is gathered. This phase makes the staff aware of the 
importance of data protection, and gathers information about the potential losses that could 
emerge in case of vital data loss. 
Phase 2: Identify Infrastructure Vulnerabilities  
Phase 2 involves the assessment of the information management system. It is related to the 
data gathered during Phase 1. Data protection vulnerabilities are surveyed with a focus on 
technological issues, and the key issues for the future strategy are determined. This phase is 
based on the data gathered from the employees of the IT department, executives and other staff. 
A common solution has to be developed without obstructing the present business model of the 
company [8]. 
Phase 3: Develop Security Strategy and Plans 
Phase 3 is the risk analysis phase. The information gathered in Phase 1 and Phase 2 is used to 
assess the risk of data compromise in the company and other risks that may exist in the 
company’s business activities. The security strategy and ways of minimising the risk of data 
loss are developed. By using the clear information about the business model of the company, 
the types of attacks which might take place in the future can be determined. In the third phase, 
the exact procedures are created. A value matrix is used to determine the value of the expected 
risks. The main formula for OCTAVE is: 
Loss = Impact/Consequence x Probability  
OCTAVE implements no mathematical computations and thus it obtains a value of 3 for 
simplicity and a value of 1 for precision [8]. If an organisation is concerned with simplicity 
more than accuracy, OCTAVE is a good fit. 
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2.3 CRAMM 
CRAMM is a qualitative risk analysis and management method that was developed by the UK 
Government Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency in 1985 to provide 
government departments with a method for revising the security of information systems [9]. 
The instrument, which has undergone major revisions (currently in version 4), was then sold 
and delivered by a British firm, Insight Consulting, as the “CRAMM Manager”. CRAMM is 
used for all types of organisations. 
Security assessments relate to the need to justify investments in information systems and 
networks demonstrating a need for action by management, based on quantifiable results and 
organisation-specific countermeasures for risk analysis. The three stages of a CRAMM review 
(Fig. 4) cover the crucial elements of data collection, analysis and output results to be 
presented in a programmed risk analysis tool:  
(i) Recognising and valuing assets 
(ii) Recognising threats and vulnerabilities and computing risks 
(iii) Recognising and prioritising countermeasures.  
CRAMM is used to analyse risk for different groups of assets versus the threats to which the 
asset is vulnerable on a scale of 1 to 7. The risk matrix has default values which compare the 
activity level of threat and vulnerability. A score of 1 shows a fundamental requirement of 
safety and 7 means a high safety requirement [10]. 
 
 
Fig. 4. CRAMM method 
 
2.4 VECTOR matrix method 
VECTOR matrix is a self-assessment risk method that is open source and free. It was 
developed to help business systems identify priorities of critical risks, including information 
security risks.  
With this method, users are able to quantify and visually represent all possible aspects of risk 
to the business system.  
The VECTOR method is based on the universal principles of business risk and it is scalable for 
both small businesses and large enterprise systems in domestic and international private 
sectors [11]. 
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 The formula for the VECTOR risk assessment method is: 
RISK = V+E+C+T+O+R VECTOR. It is the acronym of the following words: 
 V = vulnerability, E = ease of execution, C = consequence, T = threat, O = operational 
importance, R = resiliency.  
Vulnerability: 
Vulnerability is a characteristic of a property or business process to indicate its weakness to 
some kind of attack. Vulnerability is linked to a threat that exploits it.  
Ease of execution: 
Ease of execution is a parameter that describes the level of expertise, knowledge, advanced 
training, special tools and equipment needed by an attacker.  
It relates to the time required to successfully carry out an attack on an information system.  
A low level of execution ease means that an attacker must invest much more effort and 
knowledge to successfully break the existing security mechanisms. 
 A high level of execution ease means that an attacker needs minimal effort for the successful 
penetration and unauthorised entry into the information system of an organisation.  
Consequence: 
Consequence refers to a loss of the economic, symbolic or psychological value of an 
organisation (for example, reputational risk for a bank in the case of loss or theft of data, 
unavailability of certain parts of information systems, reduced levels of service quality).  
Threat: 
A threat represents the probability of an event in which an attacker could damage a particular 
business system. Analysis of threats is the first step that needs to be done in the process of risk 
assessment.  
Operational importance:  
Operational importance measures the importance of the operational activity in the 
organisation.  
This could include activities such as developing, risk mitigation, security measures, and so on.  
Resiliency: 
Resilience includes the speed with which the organisation can successfully recover, reorganise 
itself and prepare to resume operations after a significant violation or failure of prescribed 
security policies. Risk scoring for this criterion is based on the inverse relationship.  
A high level of resilience (e.g., rapid recovery with minimal or no outage time) results in a low 
level of risk.  
A real case scenario of a bank can provide more explanation about the VECTOR matrix.  
Fig. 5 shows the risk assessment of information security in a bank that was developed using 
the VECTOR method. The risk values were as follows: 1-4 low, 5-7 moderate, and 8-10 high 
levels of risk for each VECTOR [11]. 
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Fig. 5. Risk assessment of information security in a bank developed using VECTOR method 
 
The first column in Fig. 5 shows the important assets, business processes or business functions 
that support the overall operations of the bank. For each of these assets, the VECTOR method 
analyses the criteria to determine the risk of the observed property or business functions in 
relation to other assets within the business system in this case [12]. 
 As highlighted in Fig. 5, the largest sums in the matrix relate to workstations (with a score of 
51), network equipment (47) and firewalls at the operating system level (55); that means risks 
are the largest in these three types of assets. 
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2.5  Advantages and disadvantages of risk analysis methods 
The OCTAVE, CRAMM, CORAS and VECTOR matrix methods are good choices for risk 
analysis, but in different steps of implementation.  
A comparison of these four methods (Table 1) shows that OCTAVE has the higher percentage 
than the others [13].  
The OCTAVE method provides much more detailed and higher quality analysis and 
assessment of security risks in relation to specific information assets. Moreover, by using the 
OCTAVE method it is possible to measure more  
accurately and achieve a better assessment of the information security risk regarding a 
particular asset. However, the OCTAVE method is more complex and requires much more 
time and effort when applied to the information security risk assessment of certain assets [14].  
The qualitative risk analysis methods perform risk analysis with the help of adjectives, not 
mathematics. Methods of risk analysis using quantitative measures are not suitable for 
intensive analysis of today’s information security risks.  
Unlike in the past, contemporary information systems have a complicated structure and are 
heavily used. Thus, the intensive mathematical steps implemented to model risk for 
complicated environments make this process more difficult. The calculations performed 
during the risk analysis process are very complex.  
Quantitative methods may not be able to model complex risk scenarios today. Methods of risk 
analysis based on qualitative measures are more suitable for the complicated risk environment 
of today's information systems. The OCTAVE method also includes qualitative risk analysis 
methods[15].  
The features and advantages of the OCTAVE approach are as follows: 
(i) Self-directed – Small teams of organisational personnel across business units and IT work 
together to concentrate on the security requirements of the organisation. 
(ii) Flexible – In each method it is possible to 
customise the organisation’s unique risk environment, security and resiliency objectives, and 
expertise level. 
(iii) Evolved – OCTAVE moves the organisation toward an operational risk-based view of 
security and addresses technology in a business context. 
(iv) Price – The OCTAVE model is freely available.  
Some weaknesses can be identified as follows: 
(i) The OCTAVE method can be modified to fit the requirements of an organisation. Not 
all processes have to be accomplished, which can affect the place where risk analysis fits into 
the method. Thus, the preparation required can be minimised. 
(ii) Not giving information about the cost of analysis despite it being able to show the 
resources and people needed to do the risk analysis based on the needs of an organisation. 
(iii) Other characteristics are not made available in the framework. There are several other risk 
analysis methods such as CRAMM, and there are also baselines which include a broader 
variety of information security features such as the ISO 17799 framework, and which are 
possible to be used to characterise other criteria [16].  
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In order to analyse the characteristics of CRAMM, CORAS, OCTAVE and VECTOR 
methods, Table 1 presents the suumary of these methods with strenghts and weaknesses. 
 
Table 1. Summarises the strengths and weaknesses of the four methods (CRAMM, CORAS, OCTAVE 
and VECTOR methods). 
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3. Design of the Proposed Method 
In this section we present the analysis of the problem that the project addresses, an overview of 
the design of the method (both the conceptual and physical design), and a justification of how 
it meets the identified requirements [17]. The steps of the migration process, the analysis of 
risk in the steps of the migration process, and the proposed risk analysis method are each 
discussed. 
3.1 Process analysis  
Legacy software applications are important in organisations. They usually form the backbone 
of  the organisation. It means that if one of these software applications stops working, the 
business might be noticeably influenced. A failure in one of these systems might have serious 
business impacts.  
3.1.1 Which software should be migrated 
Today, many organisations want to migrate their legacy software to new environments so that 
their information systems can be more easily maintained. They also can adapt the system to 
new business requirements. It is important for organisations to identify which software should 
be migrated. Fig. 7 shows four categories of existing applications in organisations [18]. 
 
 
Fig. 6.  Application categories 
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As shown in the Fig. 6, applications can be categorised into the following four groups: 
• Category1: Low business value, low quality – such a system should be scrapped 
• Category 2: High business value, low quality – such as system should be migrated or 
replaced if a suitable system is available 
• Category 3: Low business value, high-quality – such a system should be scrapped or 
maintained 
• Category 4: High business value, high-quality – operations should be continued using 
normal maintenance practices. 
Thus, applications in category 3 should be migrated. They have low quality, but they are 
necessary for the organisation. 
3.1.2 Major phases in migration process  
The process of migrating a legacy system consists of five main phases, as illustrated in Fig. 7 
These five phases are:  
• Phase 1: Justification 
• Phase 2: Legacy system understanding 
• Phase 3: Target system development 
• Phase 4: Migration 
• Phase 5: Testing. 
Each phase has possible risks that should be identified, prioritised and responded to. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Five major phases in legacy system migration 
3.2 Selected risk analysis methods  
Currently, there are many methods for risk analysis in relation to information security, but in 
different steps of implementation. In the previous sections, we explained some different 
methods of risk analysis. This section recaps two of these methods which are used in this 
project, namely, the VECTOR matrix method and the OCTAVE method. The project 
enhances the VECTOR method by adapting the OCTAVE method [19]. 
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3.2.1 VECTOR matrix method  
The VECTOR matrix is a free, open source, simple, self-assessment, and qualitative method. 
This method was developed to help prioritise critical risks. As explained previously, the 
VECTOR matrix illustrates all possible aspects of each risk, with a focus on vulnerability, ease 
of execution, consequence, threat probability, operational importance and resilience [11]. Fig. 
8 presents the VECTOR matrix. 
 
Fig. 8. VECTOR matrix 
3.2.2  OCTAVE 
As discussed above, one of the important concepts of OCTAVE is self-direction whereby 
employees in the organisation should practise information security risk assessment [3]. An 
analysis team composed of staff of the organisation’s business units is responsible for running 
the assessment and recording the results [8]. 
When applying OCTAVE, personnel from the operational or business units and the IT 
department work together to form the analysis team and address the security needs of the 
organisation. The analysis team carries out the following tasks: 
• Identifies critical information assets  
• Focuses risk analysis activities on these critical assets  
Considers the relationships among the critical assets, the threats to these assets and the 
vulnerabilities (both organisational and technological) that can expose the assets to threats  
Evaluates risks in the operational context, that is, how the critical assets are used to conduct the 
organisation’s business and how they are at risk due to security threats and vulnerabilities  
Creates a practice-based protection strategy for organisational improvement as well as risk 
mitigation plans to reduce the risk to the organisation’s critical assets. 
As explained previously, the OCTAVE methodology has three phases, namely, build 
asset-based threat profiles, identify infrastructure vulnerabilities, and develop a security 
strategy and plans [3][11]. 
3.3 Enhancement of VECTOR method by adapting OCTAVE method  
The VECTOR matrix method and OCTAVE method are both a good choice for the risk 
assessment of information security. Like all methods, these two methods have limitations. As 
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the migration of a legacy system should be done as soon as possible in order to avoid problems 
such as obsolete software, the risk analysis method should require less time for the analysis of 
possible risks [20]. The OCTAVE method is complex and needs a lot of time for risk analysis; 
however, the combined VECTOR method and adapted OCTAVE method does not require 
much time. In addition, combining the VECTOR and OCTAVE methods can increase the 
accuracy of the risk analysis.  
This project aimed to enhance the VECTOR method by adapting the OCTAVE method in 
order to mitigate the limitations, and make a suitable method, referred to as EVAO 
(enhancement of VECTOR method by adapting OCTAVE method) for risk analysis in the 
migration process [4].  
As previously mentioned, the migration process has five major phases, and each phase has 
some risks. In continue, these phases with their risks  and their value will be shown .  
 
As explained previously, VECTOR is an acronym of vulnerability, ease of execution, 
consequence, threat probability, operational importance, and resiliency; and OCTAVE is an 
acronym of operationally critical threat, asset and vulnerability evaluation. Each of these 
letters represents a risk that has a certain value in relation to certain assets. 
3.3.1 VECTOR matrix 
Table 2 presents an example of the results obtained using the VECTOR matrix risk analysis 
method. This matrix was distributed among five programmers and experts to complete the 
blank fields regarding the valuation of each risk. The value of each risk in the VECTOR matrix 
was ranked from 1 to 10. 
4. Evaluation of Results 
In this section, we present the results from the design phases which were used as the input for 
the implementation and testing process. The end result was the enhanced risk analysis method 
that underwent certain implementation steps as explained below.  
4.1 Design implementation 
The migration of legacy software normally takes a long time, but programmers, experts and 
stakeholders tend to carry out the process as soon as possible, because there is a risk of the 
software becoming obsolete if the process takes a lot of time. Therefore, the method of risk 
analysis in the migration process should also be completed as quickly as possible. In addition, 
the migration of legacy software is an expensive process; therefore, it is essential that the 
method delivers results with high precision in order to avoid the possibility of failure [21].  
4.1.1 VECTOR matrix 
In the design phase of this study, the VECTOR matrix was designed for the migration of 
legacy software. In the next step, the value of the assets should be determined. 
For this purpose, we distributed five questionnaires to five programmers. Based on their 
experience, the participants wrote the risk values of each asset in the VECTOR matrix. 
To obtain the final result of the VECTOR matrix method regarding the value of the risks for 
each asset, we calculated the average of each parameter of risk in each asset from all the 
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questionnaire responses. The final values are listed in Table 2 the numbers were added 
together to get the sum value. 
 
Table 2. Result of VECTOR matrix risk analysis 
Asset (Information) V E C T O R Sum 
Phase 1: Justification        
Cost 8 8 9 7 5 9 46 
Possibility of migration failure 7 8 9 8 7 1
0 
49 
Size 4 3 2 3 1 2 15 
Complexity 4 5 6 5 4 6 30 
Time 7 8 4 1 4 2 26 
Phase 2: Legacy system understanding        
Poor or no documentation 6 4 7 4 8 1 30 
Poor understanding of legacy system 6 6 5 3 2 4 26 
Phase 3: Target system development        
Language 
6 6 3 1 2 1 19 
Inappropriate migration method 4 8 6 2 7 9 36 
Inappropriate architecture 3 6 5 4 8 4 30 
Phase 4: Migration        
Constantly changing technology and 
requirements 
9 7 4 9 8 5 42 
Time 8 7 1 5 7 5 33 
Poor identification of reusable 
components 
and redundancies before the 
requirements for the target system can 
be produced 
4 1 3 2 6 1 17 
Phase 5: Testing        
Complexity 7 7 5 3 3 2 27 
After migration process        
Change GUI 9 8 8 7 9 8 49 
 
After calculating the sum of the risk values for each asset in the VECTOR matrix, the average 
of each sum should be calculated.  
 
4.1.1.1 Calculation of the risk values using the VECTOR method 
In this step, the average of each sum should be calculated. The number obtained from 
calculating the average of the sum shows the value  of  the risk [22]. If it was between 8 and 10 
(8<=x <= 10), it means the asset has a high risk value. A result between 5 and 7 (5 <= x <= 7) 
means the asset has a medium risk value, and a result between 1 and 4 (1<= x <=4) means the 
asset has a low risk value. Table 3 presents the value of each risk in the VECTOR matrix. This 
can be represented as follows:  
 
If (8 <= x <= 10 >>> High, 5 <= x <= 7 >>>  
       Medium, 1 <=x <= 4 >>> Low) 
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Table 3. Risk values in the VECTOR matrix 
 
Asset (Information) Sum Average Value of risk 
Phase 1: Justification    
Cost 47 7.83 High 
Possibility of migration failure 46 7.66 High 
Size 16 2.5 Low 
Complexity 30 5 Medium 
Time 27 4.5 Medium 
Phase 2: Legacy system understanding    
Poor or non-existent documentation 31 5.16 Medium 
Poor understanding of legacy system 26 4.33 Medium 
Phase 3: Target system development    
Language 19 3.16 Medium 
Inappropriate migration method 36 6 High 
Inappropriate architecture 30 5 Medium 
Phase 4: Migration    
Constantly changing technology and 
requirements 
42 7 High 
Time 33 5.5 High 
Poor identification of reusable components 
and redundancies before the requirements for 
the target system can be produced 
17 2.5 Low 
Phase 5: Testing    
Complexity 27 4.5 Medium 
After migration process    
Change GUI 49 8.16 High 
 
4.1.2 Adapting the OCTAVE method 
In adapting the OCTAVE method to be more like the VECTOR matrix, and to obtain the value 
of each risk, five programmers were asked to complete the adapted OCTAVE table in a 
questionnaire. They wrote the risk values of each asset based on their experience [16].  
To obtain the final result of the risk value for each asset from the adapted OCTAVE method, 
we calculated the average of each parameter of risk in each asset from the five questionnaire 
responses, and we wrote the final values in Table 4.  
The resulting numbers were added together to get the sum value. Table 4 shows the results 
from using the adapted OCTAVE.  
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Table 4. Results from the adapted OCTAVE Method 
Asset (Information) OC TA VE Sum 
Phase 1: Justification     
Cost 8 7 7 22 
Possibility of migration failure 6 8 5 19 
Size 3 2 2 7 
Complexity 6 5 3 14 
Time 3 6 2 11 
Phase 2: Legacy system understanding     
Poor or no documentation 7 2 4 13 
Poor understanding of legacy system 3 1 2 6 
Phase 3: Target system development     
Language 3 5 4 12 
Inappropriate migration method 9 7 3 19 
Inappropriate architecture 6 4 3 13 
Phase 4: Migration     
Constantly changing technology and requirements 8 7 6 21 
Time 4 6 3 13 
Poor identification of reusable components and 
redundancies before the requirements  
1 3 3 7 
Phase 5: Testing     
Complexity 1 5 4 10 
After migration process     
Change GUI 4 7 3 14 
4.1.2.1 Calculation of the risk values using the adapted OCTAVE method 
Like the VECTOR method, the average of each sum should also be calculated for the adapted 
OCTAVE method. The number obtained from calculating the average of the sum shows the 
value of the risk [18]. 
If the result obtained from calculating the average is between 8 and 10 (8<= x <= 10), it means 
the asset has a high risk value. 
 If the result is between 5 and 7 (5 <= x <= 7), the asset has a medium risk value, and if the 
result is between 1 and 4 (1<= x <=4), the asset has a low risk value. This can be represented as 
follows: 
If (8 <= x <= 10 >>> High, 5 <= x <= 7 >>> Medium, 1 <=x <= 4 >>> Low). 
 
 
Table 5. Risk values from adapted OCTAVE method
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4.2 Comparing the risk values using the EVAO method 
After calculating the final results for the value of each risk by the VECTOR and adapted 
OCTAVE methods, we compared the results obtained for each asset. If they were same, for 
example  in  the justification phase, and the risk had the same value (e.g., low) in both the 
OCTAVE and VECTOR methods, it means the EVAO method worked well for the calculation 
of the risk regarding this asset. Table 6 shows the EVAO results based on a comparison of the 
risk values from the adapted OCTAVE and VECTOR methods [23]. 
 
Table 6. Risk values using the EVAO method 
Asset 
(Information) 
V E C T O R S Av V OCT A VE S Av V C 
Phase1: 
Justification 
                
Cost 8 8 9 7 5 9 46 7.66 H  8 7 7 22 7.33 M  M  
Possibility of 
migration 
failure 
7 8 9 8 7 10 49 8.16 H  6 8 5 19 6.33 M  M 
Size 4 3 2 3 1 2 15 2.5 L  3 2 2 7 2.33 L L 
Complexity 4 5 6 5 4 6 30 5 M  6 5 3 14 4.66 M M 
Time 7 8 4 1 4 2 26 4.33 L  3 6 2 11 3.66 L  L  
Phase 2: 
Legacy system 
understanding 
                
Poor or no 
documentation 
6 4 7 4 8 1 30 5 M  7 2 4 13 4.33 L  M 
KSII TRANSACTIONS ON INTERNET AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS VOL. 8, NO. 6, June 2014                                   2135 
Poor 
understanding 
of legacy 
system 
6 6 5 3 2 4 26 4.33 L  3 1 2 6 2 L L  
Phase 3: Target 
system 
development 
                
Language 6 6 3 1 2 1 19 3.16 L 3 5 4 12 4 L  L  
Inappropriate 
migration 
method 
4 8 6 2 7 9 36 6 M  9 7 3 19 6.33 M  M  
Inappropriate 
architecture 
3 6 5 4 8 4 30 5 M  6 4 3 13 4.33 L  M 
Phase 4: 
Migration 
                
Constantly 
changing 
technology and 
requirements 
9 7 4 9 8 5 42 7 M  8 7 6 21 7 M M 
Time 8 7 1 5 7 5 33 5.5 M 4 6 3 13 4.33 L  M 
Poor 
identification 
of reusable 
components ,  
redundancies 
of  the 
requirements 
4 1 3 2 6 1 17 2.5 L 1 3 3 7 2.33 L L 
Phase 5: 
Testing 
                
Complexity 7 7 5 3 3 2 27 4.5 L 1 5 4 10 3.33 L  L  
After 
migration 
process 
                
Change GUI 9 8 8 7 9 8 49 8.16 H  4 7 3 14 4.66 M M 
 
With reference to the results presented in Table 6, it can be seen that different risk values are 
shown for some assets. For example, the risk value of “cost” in phase one obtained from the 
VECTOR method (high) was different to the value obtained from the adapted OCTAVE 
method (medium). Therefore, to identify the risk value of the cost asset, we needed to identify 
the average of the VECTOR and OCTAVE values. Table 7 shows the result for the risk value 
of the cost asset. 
 
Table 7. Final result for different answers using the VECTOR and adapted OCTAVE methods 
Asset (information) Value of risk from 
adapted OCTAVE 
Value of risk in 
VECTOR 
Final result 
Cost  Medium (7.33) High (7.66) ((7.66+7.33)/2)= 7.49 
Medium  
Possibility of 
migration failure 
Medium (6.33) High (8.16) ((6.33+8.16)/2)=7.24 
Medium   
Poor or non-existent 
documentation 
Low (4.33) Medium (5) ((4.33+5)/2)=4.66 
Medium  
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5. Conclusions 
After conducting a review of the literature and carrying out research through questionnaires, 
the basic concept and theory on the enhanced methods for legacy software migration have 
been identified. The main steps in the research were as follows:  
(i) The issue of risk assessment (risk types and potential negative risk conditions) for legacy 
software migration projects was studied. In addition, a number of risk assessment 
techniques were analyzed. 
(ii) Two risk assessments methods, namely, the OCTAVE and VECTOR methods were used 
in combination to achieve better results in risk assessment.  
(iii) Empirical studies were performed using a questionnaire approach that showed a more 
accurate assessment of each risk during the migration process. 
Most small and medium enterprises do not apply a risk analysis method for the migration of 
their legacy software. The proposed method can provide them with a new way to carry out the 
analysis of risk in the migration of software, even though these risks can be variable among 
different organizations. 
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